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Jacob Dahl Rendtorff, Roskilde / Denmark
 
 
Hannah Arendt and the Law and Ethics of Administration 
Bureaucratic evil, political thinking and reflective judgment 
 
Abstract:  After  the  absurd  terrorism  and  violence  of  the  totalitarianism  and  bureaucratic 
administrative and legal systems of the 20
th century it does not give any meaning to rationalize harm 
as meaningful evil that even though it is evil may have some importance for the development of the 
world towards the good. Rather, evil is incomprehensible and as radical and banal evil it challenges 
human rationality. This is indeed the case when we are faced with instrumental and rationalized 
administrative and political evil. Therefore, we must analyse the banality of evil in politics and in 
administration in order to understand the concept of evil. Moreover, as proposed by Hannah Arendt, 
we need to fight this evil with political thinking and social philosophy. The only way to deal with harm 
and wrongdoing is to return a concept of responsibility that is closely linked to reflective thinking. In 
this paper, we will on the basis of a discussion of the banality of evil explore this in relation to 
Hannah  Arendt’s  analysis  of  the  administration  of  evil,  as  expressed  by  the personality  of  Adolf 
Eichmann.  Finally,  we  will  place this  concept of  administrative  evil  in  Hannah  Arendt’s general 
political philosophy.  
 
Introduction 
How do we explain the horrors of modernity, Auschwitz and the death camps, the Gulag or 
more recently the terror of September 11 and in Iraq and Afghanistan and all over the world? 
On the one hand we ascribe this evil to willed demonic human actions. On the other hand our 
concepts  of  evil  become  insufficient  and  we  are  confronted  with  the  radical 
incomprehensibility of evil actions.
1  In this paper I will address Hannah Arendt’s philosophy 
of responsibility and reflective judgment as way to deal with political and administrative evil 
as one of the many faces of evil in contemporary society. I will begin with a discussion of the 
banality  of  evil.  Then  I  will  explore  this  in  relation  to  Hannah  Arendt’s  analysis  of  the 
administration of evil as an example of political evil in administrative and legal systems, as 
expressed  by  the  personality  of  Adolf  Eichmann.  Finally,  we  will  place  this  concept  of 
administrative evil in Hannah Arendt’s general political philosophy.  
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I. Hannah Arendt: The banality of evil 
The German-American philosopher Hannah Arendt, who had to flee from the Nazis to the 
United States, published in 1951 one of the most important works on the terrors of systems in 
the  20th  century,  The  Origins  of  Totalitarianism  (Arendt  (1951),  1964)  which  was  later 
developed in her work in Eichmann in Jerusalem. An Essay on the Banality of Evil from 
1964. I think that Arendt’s concept represents a new way to approach the problem of evil that 
goes beyond classical concepts of. Arendt’s philosophy contains in this connection a critical 
evaluation of the concept of evil as a result of a demonic and devilish evil spiritual force.
2 
Looking closely on Arendt’s conception of evil in relation to political philosophy we may 
argue that it represents a revolt against the implicit theodicy in the political ideology that was 
dominating during the Iraq war. After the terror action against World Trade Center in New 
York President Bush has  several  times emphasized that the War on Terror  and the fight 
against Osama bin Laden was a fight between good and evil. Although they finally emerged 
as  miserable  and  somewhat  insignificant  men  Saddam  Hussein  and  Kaddafi  were  also 
portrayed as the incarnation of evil and the war against Iraq had similarities with a crusade 
against  evil  powers  in  the  world.  With  terrorism  we  come  as  close  as  possible  to 
“intentionally willed evil”. The actions of the terrorists in Spain as in Russia and the evil of 
Bin Laden, Hussein and Kaddafi have been compared to the crimes of Hitler, Stalin and other 
totalitarian regimes in the 20. Century as an expression of “absolute evil”. 
Arendt  asks  the  question,  how  Holocaust,  that  is  the  killings  of  six  million  Jews  in 
concentration camps was possible. She does not think that such evil was beyond every human 
understanding.
3  But none the less, evil requires that we try to understand it and thereby 
creates a defence against it. Arendt stated that evil in Nazism should be understood as a 
historically conditioned modern political phenomenon , which is essentially different from 
earlier forms of tyranny and despotism. According to Arendt, totalitarianism is characterized 
by the fact that technically rationality and calculation of utility is used to realize an irrational 
ideology that often is based on anti-Semitism or racism. Totalitarianism as a political system 
reaches the character of nightmares, when it uses technology to make change radically human 
beings and society by the use of systematic murder or ideologically organized madness. 
Terror  creates  constant  insecurity  and  unsafe  feelings  among  individuals  in  society.  In 
totalitarianism elites are sanctioning their power by the use of secret police.  
Concentration camps and death camps are essential to establish total power to military 
leaders. The function of the camps is, with the sharp insights of Arendt, to make human 
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beings superfluous and meaningless.
4 Arendt argues that radical evil in the totalitarian regime 
consisted in its attempt to become master over human nature and accordingly in its attempt to 
form human nature according to its own will. Arendt continued in the 1950s and 1960s as one 
of the most important American political philosophers to be captured by the problem of evil 
in totalitarianism. It was in this context that she in 1963 accepted by the week newspaper The 
New  Yorker  to  report  from  the  court  case  in  Jerusalem  against  the  Nazi  criminal  Adolf 
Eichmann, who was considered one of the major responsible bureaucrats for the transport of 
Jews to concentration camps.
5  
Arendt argued ironically and satirically against the predominant view, that Eichmann 
who had been presented as a symbol of intentionally willed evil, rather as the incarnation of 
the devil, was nothing special. Contrary to world public Arendt reduced Eichmann to  be a 
banal and petit bourgeois bureaucrat.
6 He had not deepness or moral imagination and his evil 
cape from his lack of ability to himself in the place of the other. Contrary to the fascination of 
Eichmann’s  devil  personality,  Arendt  argued  that  his  evil  consisted  in  his  incapacity  to 
distinguish between good and evil.  
In this sense the banality of evil is the frightening consequence of radical evil that made 
every human being superfluous and meaningless. The personality of the terrorists, the Nazi 
soldiers or Stalin’s butchers may be said to be characterized by the same mediocrity and 
ideological blindness. There is no reason in evil. It is meaningless and incomprehensible. This 
radical evil as the banality of evil is at the limits of our imagination and it is this radicalism 
which may make it difficult for us to understand that evil is banal that is the result of actions 
of people who are not able to have moral reflection. This kind of radical evil emerges in 
different ways. While Eichmann was a bureaucrat who killed at distance and never himself 
meat with his victims it was different with the soldiers in Serbia or the rebels in Rwanda. 
They  did  not  stop  with  killing  at  a  distance,  but  they  were  confronted  directly  with  the 
sufferings  of  the  victims  and  in  some  cases  they  were  raping  their  victims  from  civil 
population. In some case they may even feel that they are victims and have sadistic enjoyment 
of their acts and therefore have a feeling of enjoying evil as a good. The “willed evil” of 
different forms of terrorists is often presented a consequence of a consequence of a rationally 
justified religious or nationalistic hate to their oppressors. And still one is marked by the 
meaningless and lack of goal in their actions. The essence of the concept of banality of evil is 
that regardless of whether it is close or at distance evil is nothing else than stupid people’s 
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violent  ideology  and  lack  of  capacity  of  moral  reflection.  The  reflections  of  Arendt  join 
Kant’s  problems  of  understanding  how  it  could  be  possible  with  thoughtful  action  to 
challenge the universal language of morality. Evil actions are committed by people without 
deepness or conscience. This is why it does not give any meaning to ascribe to terrorists or 
“rogue states” like North Korea, Iraq, Iran or Syria as representatives of the demoniac axe of 
evil.  
Such  banalization  of  evil  is  very  provoking,  because  it  makes  it  difficult  to  give  a 
traditional psychological explanation of the sufferings of the victims and give them moral 
rehabilitation by the fact that they were confronted with monstrous evil personalities. Like 
Eichmann, the Serbian politicians, who were convicted of war crimes or the suicide bombers 
of  September  11,  appeared  to  be  “ordinary  men”  and  it  is  difficult  to  see  them  as 
representatives of complex psychological personalities. It is a characteristic aspect of Arendt’s 
doctrine of evil that it refuses  the insights  of the explicatory power of  psychoanalysis to 
understand  the  complex  motives  of  evil  personalities.  Even  though  concepts  of  double 
personality and perverse precision may apply to the totalitarian personality, they are not really 
present in the work of Arendt.
7  
However,  this  lack  of  psychoanalytic  explanation  and  dependence  on  existentialist 
philosophical anthropology helps us  avoid the deadlock of saying that Eichmann or other 
criminals cannot be ascribed responsibility for their actions, because morally they did not 
know what they were doing. In fact, courts and legal authorities cannot ignore the moral and 
legal responsibility of such criminals, because they were morally free to do otherwise. In fact, 
the hate and moral incapacities of the perpetrators gives us the difficult challenge within penal 
law that it is to make people who do not have capacities of moral reflection to think ethically, 
regret, understand the monstrosity of their actions and honestly seek forgiveness. 
It is a misunderstanding to think that Arendt’s doctrine of the banality of evil takes away 
the direct intentions from the actions of the perpetrators. On the contrary. In order to respect 
the victims, we have to maintain that terrorists and war criminals are causes of evil, because it 
is  not  possible to  refer  to  a higher more powerful evil that they are determined by. The 
perpetrators have no escape because they are existentially responsibility for their violence and 
brutality. One of the most worrying aspects of the banality of evil is that the perpetrators have 
lost the moral awareness of this responsibility and it is this lack of responsibility that makes it 
possible for them to do their evil actions. If they had had a capacity of moral reflection, they 
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would be able to follow the moral law of respect for the eternal value of human beings as well 
as for their integrity and dignity.  
We may conceive Arendt’s approach as a criticism of the tendency of rationalization of 
evil that was dominating Western reflections about evil, where it has been attempted to justify 
evil as having a meaning as a necessary opposition to the good from the perspective of the 
will  of  God,  human  freedom  or  necessary  movement  of  history.  As  mentioned,  the 
contemporary version of this is the concept of the demoniac will of destruction, a clearly 
sinful will that consciously has chosen to confront the good and nihilistically destroy the 
whole world and itself.  
However,  we  may  argue  that  even  if  Eichmann  or  some  contemporary  terrorists  or 
soldiers are not really evil, other criminals like Göring or Hitler were real demoniac persons. 
Moreover,  don’t  we  have  moral  responsibility  to  maintain  that  fanatic  terrorists  are 
incarnations of evil? In this context, Arendt’s thesis was provocative because it was in full 
contrast to the concept of the enemy of its time, where it was supposed that there must have 
been some ice cold, calculating brain behind the killings of Jews in concentration camps. 
What is so frustrating and unbearable for the victims about the thoughtlessness of Eichmann 
combined with his dutiful commitment to the extermination of the European Jews is exactly 
the  fact  that  many  of  the  German  soldiers  and  officers  like  Eichmann  were  nothing  but 
ordinary human beings that were following orders in a large military system without thinking 
on their own.
8 
 
II. Detailed analysis of Eichmann’s banality of evil 
But how can we characterize the political and administrative evil of Adolf Eichmann if we 
look at it in detail. It can be argued that Hannah Arendt show us the institutional set-up and 
organizational  dimensions  of moral  indifference and this  is  why this  kind of evil  can be 
described  as  an  indication  of  the  banality  of  evil.  Accordingly,  from  an  institutional 
perspective we can argue that the figure of Eichmann is not only a psychological figure, but 
the  institutional  dimension  of  this  figure  as  the  prototype  of  the  morally  indifference  of 
administrative and legal bureaucracy is very present. We can say that Arendt describes the 
essential  dimensions  of  this  kind  of  personality  that  characterizes  agency  in  legal  and 
administrative systems. In fact, role playing as described by social psychology of Stanley 
Milgram  and  Philip  Zimbardo  is  an  important  element  of  understanding  how  Arendt’s 
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interpretation of Eichmann provides us with the dimensions of an institutional analysis.
9 As 
social psychology emphasizes role expectations in social system are important for compliance 
to the logic of the system. Institutional action is characterized by such expectations and 
obligations in social action patterns in modern society. As it is implicit in Arendt’s analysis 
there is certain blindness in the role agency because genuine human action is replaced by role 
behavior.  The  role  behavior  is  a  kind  of  system-based  discipline  behavior  where  the 
individual is submitted to the constraints of the system. It is on this foundation that we can go 
deeper into the definitions of moral blindness  and banality of evil as defined by Hannah 
Arendt in her book on Eichmann in Jerusalem. Essay on the Banality of Evil.  As close look 
on  her  way  to  describe  Eichmann  leads  to  the  following  structural  features  of  moral 
indifference or moral blindness in Eichmann that relates to his existence as a role-player in a 
social system that carries the banality of evil with him through his agency:  
1. A concept of the administrator an obedient bureaucrat. Eichmann argued that he was 
only following orders and therefore he was not guilty in any legal sense, but maybe in a moral 
sense, but this would not have any significance in a legal trail. Because on the existing legal 
system he had done nothing wrong. “Eichmann feels guilty before God, not before the law”.
10 
Eichmann plied “Not guilty in the sense of the indictment”. 
11 
2. A concept  of  the bureaucrat  with no personal involvement  in  his  work. Eichmann 
argued that he was not personally committed, but that he only did his work as an objective 
and neutral bureaucrat following the orders that was given to him. Eichmann said “With the 
killings of Jews I had nothing to do. I never killed a Jew, or a Non-Jew, for that matter – I 
never killed any human being. I never gave an order to kill a Jew or a Non-Jew. I just did not 
do it”.
12  
3. The bureaucrat had no bad conscience and no evil will. Eichmann insisted that there 
was no inner bastard in him. And there was agreement that he was no psychopath. It was 
shown that half a dozen psychiatrists had certified him as “Normal” and his attitude towards 
his family was “not only normal, but most desirable”. It was difficult to say that Eichmann 
had  a  “perverted  sadistic  personality”
13  or  that  he  was  characterized  by  a  strong  anti-
Semitism.  
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4. The bureaucrat is not necessarily intelligent or clever. There is no deep personality 
behind his actions. He is rather ordinary and mediocre. Eichmann was for example doing 
rather poorly in school.
14 Eichmann didn’t really know what he wanted to do with his life and 
it was a kind of coincidence that he entered into the SS. It was without any real deep decision-
making that he acted in his life. And he is therefore an illustration of the existential archetype 
of inauthentic man. 
5. The bureaucrat is often from the middle classes. Arendt said that Eichmann appeared 
as a typical member of the lower middle classes, even though he came from a middle-class 
family. “In Court Eichmann gave the impression of a typical member of the lower middle 
classes, and this impression was more than borne out by every sentence he spoke or wrote 
while in prison. But this was misleading; he was rather the déclassé son of a solid middle-
class family.
15 This is an indication of the bureaucrat as someone who chooses the job out of 
necessity rather than personal wish.  
6. The  bureaucrat  may  show  ambition  and  engagement  within  the  system.  Arendt 
emphasizes that though the career of Eichmann before entering into the SS and Nazi system 
was rather insignificant, his engagement in the Nazi-system made him very soon flourish as 
an expert in the Jewish question. He became an efficient administrator and he was very good 
in  implementing  the  policies  that  came  from  the  top.  He  was  committed  to  solving  the 
“Jewish question” and he contributed significantly to the Madagascar Plan suggesting that the 
Jews should be removed to Madagascar. Eichmann advanced very quickly in the Nazi-system 
from Untersturmbannführer over Hauptsturmführer to Obersturmbannführer.
16 
7. The bureaucrat has no ethical formulation competency that goes beyond following the 
rules of the system. Even though he seemed to be efficient Arendt emphasizes that Eichmann 
had no ability to think from the standpoint of somebody else. In fact, his whole relation to the 
world was marked by self-invented clichés and he was unable both to think and speak. “The 
longer one listened to him, the more obvious it became that his inability to speak was closely 
connected with an inability to think, namely, to think from the standpoint of somebody else. 
No communication was possible with him, not because he lied but because he was surrounded 
by the reliable of all safeguards against the worlds and the presence of others, and hence the 
reality as such”.
17 
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8. The bureaucrats who do acts of moral blindness cannot be considered as an ordinary 
criminal. Arendt emphasizes that the case of Eichmann could not really be considered as a 
case of bad faith and of self-deception because he felt in total harmony with his surroundings 
and he thought that he was following the rules of the system. This behavior may be seen as a 
part of his existence as a cliché and of his role in the system.  
9. Objectivation is an integrated part of the bureaucratic attitude. Eichmann was a part 
of a system that was characterized by the attitude of objectivation and compartmentalization. 
Compartmentalization  is  indicated  by  the  fact  that  Eichmann  only  was  responsible  for 
organizing the final solution, but he never actually saw the killings. Objectivation implied the 
objective  relation  to  the  killing  of  the  Jews.  “This  “objective  attitude”  –  talking  about 
concentration camps in terms of “administration” and about extermination camps in terms of 
“economy” – was typical of the SS mentality, and something Eichmann was very proud of. 
By  its  objectivity  (Sachlichkeit),  the  SS  officers  dissociated  itself  from  such  “emotional” 
types as Streicher, that “unrealistic fool”, and also from certain “Teutonic-Germanic Party 
bigwigs who behaved as though they were clad in horns and pelts”.
18   
10.  The  bureaucrat  does  not  take  responsibility  for  political  decisions  but 
implement decisions. Eichmann said that he had doubts about the final solution and preferred 
a more peaceful and not so bloody outcome. But when it was said that the final solution had 
to be implemented he did not protest. Arendt cites Eichmann: “At the moment I sensed a kind 
of Pontius Pilate feeling, for I felt free of all guilt”.
19 She continues “Who was he to judge? 
Who was he to “to have [his] own thoughts in this matter”? Well, he was neither the first nor 
the last to be ruined by modesty”, Arendt sarcastically comments.
20 Instead, Eichmann started 
the operation by the necessary legislation to make victims stateless and negotiate with Jewish 
councils on transportation and other matters. 
11.  The victims collaborate in their own extermination. Arendt emphasizes in the 
book how the Nazi used the Jews to collaborate in their own extermination. The Jews in the 
ghetto used police to have order and this police was as rough as the Nazis. The former chief 
Rabbi of Berlin, Leo Baeck did not tell people that Auschwitz was dead and therefore people 
volunteered to go to Auschwitz.
21 Moreover, the Jewish authorities die Judenräte wanted to 
keep law and order and in some ca ses they also prevented people from escaping. But could 
they have done otherwise being forced to it by the Nazis. This shows the complexity of the 
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relation between perpetrators and victims and how the victims were used to fulfill their own 
execution.  
12.  The  duty  of  obedience  is  the  first  virtue  of  the  bureaucrat.  Eichmann 
emphasized his admiration for Hitler as der Führer. He saw himself as a law-abiding citizen 
who followed the orders of society as a requirement of being faithful to society. But for 
Eichmann this very soon turned into total obedience: “Since, in addition to performing what 
he conceived as the duties of a law-abiding citizen, he had also acted upon orders – always so 
careful to be “covered” – he became completely muddled, and ended by stressing alternately 
the virtues and vices of blind obedience, or the “obedience of corpses”, Kadavergehorsam, as 
he himself called it”.
22 
13.  The bureaucrat considers the norms of the system as the universal morality. 
Eichmann shows this commitment to the norms of the system by a reference to the Kantian 
definition of duty. He argued that he followed the categorical imperative of the Führer. Arendt 
cites that Eichmann said: “What I meant by my remark about Kant that the principle of my 
will must always be such that can become the principle of general laws”.
23 Eichmann said that 
he had read Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason and had tried to live according to it, but had 
stopped when he was going to carry out the final solution. Arendt says that Eichmann may 
have transformed the categorical principle to the Führer principle of “Act in such a way that 
the  Führer,  if  he  knew  your  action,  would  approve  it”.
24  Eichmann  contribute  to  change 
“Thou  shalt  not  kill”  in  to  its  opposite  “Thou  shall  kill”  so  that  not  to  kill  became  a 
temptation.
25 
14.  It is a characteristic of the bureaucratic system that it makes opposition look 
useless and meaningless. The Nazis did not allow the opponents to be heroes, but they gave 
them an anonymous death.  Moreover, they tried to  make opposition look impossible and 
useless so that all victims would give in. In this sense, it seems stupid to try to oppose the 
destiny. However, as Arendt emphasizes it was not everywhere that the killings and the final 
solution was accomplished. So resistance was possible.
26 Moreover, the system wants to strip 
every human dignity of the victims and therefore it tries not to make any victim appear as a 
hero.  
15.  The  bureaucrat  may  be  so  devoted  to  his  task  in  the  system  that  he  over 
performs even when opportunistic leaders  want  to  stop. This  is  the result of the relation 
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between Eichmann and Himmler who towards the end of the war ask Eichmann to slow down 
because he wants to cover up of the actions. But Eichmann is not happy with this and he 
wants to continue his mission and accomplish it. He is so devoted to his mission in the system 
and he cannot stop when it is required of him. 
With these dimensions of the actions of the bureaucratic administrator as the originator 
of  administrative  evil  in  the  totalitarian  system  Arendt  ends  by  sarcastically  describing 
Eichmann going to the gallows “with great dignity” and performing all his clichés of the 
Nazi-system. Arendt ends the description by saying “It was as though in those last minutes he 
was summing up the lesson that his long course in human wickedness had taught us – the 
lesson of the fearsome, word-and-thought-defying banality of evil”.
27  It is an important part 
of the epilogue of the book that Arendt wants to argue that the trail in Jerusalem in some 
sense  was  inappropriate  because  an  international  tribunal  and  trial  was  needed  because 
Eichmann’s crime was not only a crime against the Jews but indeed a crime against humanity. 
Therefore  it  should  an  international  tribunal  that  should  be  responsible  for  trail  against 
Eichmann. Arendt writes that the crimes that we deal with are a new sort of crime which can 
be seen as a crime against the human status as such. 
28 
In the postscript Arendt sums up her analysis of Eichmann in order to understand his 
totalitarian personality as an agent of the banality of evil. She emphasizes that the problem 
with Eichmann was that he had no other motives than personal ambition. He would not have 
killed at close hand, e.g. His superior, but he was able to kill at distance because of his 
ambition of being a good administrator and bureaucrat, i.e. to fulfill the task and role of being 
a bureaucrat. Arendt says: “And this diligence in itself was in no way criminal; he certainly 
would never have murdered his superior in order to inherit his post. He merely, to put the 
matter  colloquially,  never  realized  what  he  was  doing.  It  was  precisely  this  lack  of 
imagination which enabled him to sit for months on end facing a German Jew who was 
conducting the police interrogation, pouring out his heart to the man and explaining again and 
again how it was that he reached only the rank of lieutenant colonel in the S.S and that it had 
not been his fault that he was not promoted. In principle he knew quite well what it was all 
about, and in this final statement to the court he spoke of the “revaluation of values prescribed 
by  the  [Nazi]  government”.
29  With  this  Arendt  show  how  his  principal  concern  was 
promotion and to accomplish is role in the system. 
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Arendt continues in her description of Eichmann as the incarnation of the banality of 
evil: “He was not stupid. It was sheer thoughtlessness- something by no means identical with 
stupidity – that predisposed him to become one of the greatest criminals of that period. And if 
this is “banal” and even funny, if with the best will in the world one cannot extract any 
diabolical  or  demonic  profundity  from  Eichmann,  that  is  still  far  from  calling  it 
commonplace.”
30  Here  we  see  an  important  distinction  between  commonplace  and  the 
banality of Eichmann. Even if he looks like ordinary man and is a kind of ordinary man we 
may still say that his crime is extraordinary exactly due to its extreme banality. Arendt shows 
that the banality of Eichmann makes him different from the common place morality of every 
man. The fact that he is not able to say other things than clichés at the time of his death shows 
the  high  degree  of  banality  of  existence.  And  Arendt  continues:  “Such  remoteness  from 
reality  and  such  thoughtlessness  can  wreck  more  havoc  than  all  the  evil  instincts  taken 
together which, perhaps, are inherent in man – that is in fact the lesson one could learn in 
Jerusalem.”
31   
Arendt goes on to discuss that the crime committed was a crime of genocide. Moreover, 
she insists on the fact that Eichmann still has full responsibility for his actions and should be 
sentenced accordingly. Moreover Arendt insists that an international court is needed to deal 
with the kind of crime against humanity that Eichmann is responsible for. 
What kind of consequences for institutional analysis of the understanding of the banality 
of evil and for the political philosophy of evil can we draw from this analysis of Eichmann? 
Maybe we can say that the different element of the description of the bureaucratic personality 
illustrates  the  institutional  dimensions  of  roles  in  systems  that  constitute  the  bureaucratic 
personality. We can use these elements as the basis for analysis of bureaucratic mentalities 
and the creation of evil in different context of human action in organizational systems and 
social and political institutions.   
 
III. Responsibility and reflective judgment 
What is fascinating about Arendt’s thesis of the banality of evil is in this context that evil is 
nothing but was is made by social and institutional administrative political and legal systems 
and this helps us to be liberated from radical evil as an absolute power in the universe. We do 
not have to survive existentially and ethically by making the demoniac by inventing pictures 
of our strong enemies or changing human beings like terrorists or dictators into cynical brains 
of intelligent and exiting criminals, as it is the case with the production of myths and symbols 
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as  it  is  proposed  by  many  movies  and  fictive  representations  of  evil.  It  is  important  to 
recognize the fact that by being aware of the banality of Eichmann’s behaviour, it became 
possible for Arendt to understand Holocaust as the result of human failure rather than the 
expression of an evil force in history or nature beyond our possible control. 
Evil is not primarily based on evil motives, because it has no depth and only what is good 
can fully exist, as Arendt says in her references to the philosophy of Augustin. In fact, looking 
back on Arendt’s early work about the concept of love in Augustin’s philosophy we may find 
the key to her critical reflections about the concept of evil.
32 We could argue that Arendt in 
her concept of evil presupposes a universe where evil cannot exist in it -self because it is 
always a privation with regard to the almighty power of God. With this concept of evil we are 
close to the metaphysical philosophy of Augustin. 
As indicated evil does not have an independent existence, but originates in mediocrity 
and dogmatic blindness in administrative, legal and political systems and it is this intellectual 
inferiority that characterizes terrorists and ideological fanatics. We perceive that Arendt may 
be  influenced  by  Heidegger’s  concept  of  thought  and  thinking  according  to  which  real 
thought is the capacity to go beyond the established boundaries of systems and science.
33 
Arendt argues that the people who do evil have  not reach the level of thinking as reflective 
interrogation  as  mentioned  by  Heidegger.  However,  Arendt  goes  beyond  Heidegger by 
linking the concept of thinking to moral judgement and the capacity of compassion, of putting 
one-self in the place of the other.
34 
It may be easier to understand Hannah Arendt’s concern for the criticism of the absolute 
concept  of  evil  as  many  people  regard  as  the  logical  consequence  of  the  barbarian 
totalitarianism of modern society. It would be impossible to live in a world where evil is 
determined by a thoughtful evil force that is absolute. And Arendt’s philosophy is attempt to 
escape from the threat of such a world be reinterpreting the concept of evil from the point of 
view  of  banality  of  evil  as  radical  evil.
35  As an expression of a new conception of the 
problem of evil, we are desperately in need of in this time of anguish and nervous pictures of 
enemies, the reflections of Arendt are good examples of creative political thought that in its 
method is both different from empir ical political science and sociology. This philosophy is 
critical towards builders of systems in the tradition from Plato to Hegel and Marx. Political 
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thought starts out with respect for human dignity and freedom and it seeks to fight for a 
human world building on respect for individuality and difference.  
It is important to understand that Arendt focuses on the significance of the banality of 
evil for our social institution.
36 The institutional dimensions of Holocaust are emphasized, for 
example the incapacity of Eichmann to refuse the moral blindness implied in his institutional 
socialization. It concerns the capacity to give possibility and space for thinking and judgment, 
when human beings are parts of collective responsibility in institutions. In this co ntext the 
problem of Eichmann is not only an issue for individual responsibility but it also includes 
responsibility  for  collective  actions  in  different  forms  of  modern  institutions  and 
organizations, that is schools, hospitals, ministries, military organizations, companies etc. 
In this context, the philosophy of Hannah Arendt may be presented as an extenuation of 
European  humanism  that  includes  aspects  of  Greek  and  Roman  culture.    Arendt  also 
emphasizes the independence of USA in 1776, because it in opposi tion to the French and 
Russian revolutions implied the creation of real democratic political community, where the 
constitution was based on human freedom and moral sense. This democracy was oriented 
towards equality, because it was opposing a strong separation between those in power and the 
citizens. The political thought of Arendt represents a challenge to hierarchical totalitarianism 
and it is supposed to avoid the banality of evil by fighting for a classical republicanism, where 
free and autonomous citizens in mutual respect and reciprocity are searching to work for the 
common good.  
The great conceptual and philosophical gain and also existentially liberating consequence 
of the thesis of the banality of evil is the statement that evil is not founded in t he inherited 
subconscious desire of humanity. We have the possibility to deal with evil through human 
sensitivity, moral imagination and capacity of put one self in the place of the other.
 37  Human 
responsibility is exercised through the capacities of reflective judgement.
 Arendt was working 
on the concept of judgement through her whole life, but she died before she could finish the 
third book of the trilogy The Life of the Mind: Willing, Thinking Judging, which should have 
addressed  the  problems  of  judgement.  It  was  the  intention  of  Arendt  to  conceptualize 
judgement from Immanuel Kant’s maxims as they were developed in Kritik der Urteilskraft 
(1794).
38 However, we can reconstruct Arendt’s concept of judgement from the book Lectures 
on Kant's Political Philosophy that was published in 1982 after she had died. In this book 
political  and  ethical  judgment  is  conceived  as  an  independent  capacity  of  consciousness, 
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which is different from both will and thinking.
39 Judgment is first and foremost the capacity to 
judge  about  human actions  and  political  activity.  Judgment  is  based  on  the feeling  of 
community (sensus communis) and it opens for the human capacity of ethical reflection. 
Judgment is based on human capacity to be conscious of plurality and think for him or her -
self and with this to be able to put one self in the place of the other. In judgment we 
incorporate moral sensibility and we follow critically and impartially the course of history.  
 
IV. Conclusion: Evil in modern philosophy 
In  this  paper  I  have  presented  an  alternative  view  to  the  traditional  concept  of  evil  as 
expressed  in  the  theodicy  of  modern  philosophy  where  evil  is  rationalized  as  something 
reasonable and purposeful understood as an expression of God’s plan with the universe or as 
an intentional demonic will that aims at destroying the world.  I have tried to propose an 
alternative critical conception of evil that explains harm and destruction as with the concept of 
banality of evil as proposed by Hannah Arendt.  
After this I went into a detailed analysis of Arendt’s description of the administrative evil 
of Adolf Eichmann in order to demonstrate the different dimensions of Arendt’s institutional 
and organizational concept of evil. As such this concept is terrible because it shows how 
human beings become agents and role-players in bureaucratic systems, but it also shows how 
evil is not created by individual monsters but by human institutions that can be improved and 
changed in order to prevent evil from happening. 
After the absurd terrorism and violence of the totalitarianism of the 20
th century it does 
not give any meaning to rationalize harm as meaningful evil that even though it is evil may 
have some importance for the development of the world towards the good. Rather, evil is 
incomprehensible and as radical and banal evil it challenges human rationality. Therefore, as 
proposed by Hannah Arendt, the only way to deal with harm and wrongdoing is to return a 
concept of responsibility that is closely linked to reflective thinking. 
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